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Secure Network Coding
for Wiretap Networks of Type II
Salim El Rouayheb, Emina Soljanin, Alex Sprintson
Abstract
We consider the problem of securing a multicast network against a wiretapper that can intercept
the packets on a limited number of arbitrary network edges of its choice. We assume that the network
employs the network coding technique to simultaneously deliver the packets available at the source to
all the receivers. We show that this problem can be looked at as a network generalization of the wiretap
channel of type II introduced in a seminal paper by Ozarow and Wyner. In particular, we show that
the transmitted information can be secured by using the Ozarow-Wyner approach of coset coding at
the source on top of the existing network code. This way, we quickly and transparently recover some
of the results available in the literature on secure network coding for wiretap networks. Moreover, we
derive new bounds on the required alphabet size that are independent of the network size and devise an
algorithm for the construction of secure network codes. We also look at the dual problem and analyze the
amount of information that can be gained by the wiretapper as a function of the number of wiretapped
edges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a communication network represented as a directed graph G = (V,E) with unit
capacity edges and an information source S that multicasts information to t receivers R1, . . . , Rt
located at distinct nodes. Assume that the minimum size of a cut that separates the source and
each receiver node is n. It is known that a multicast rate of n is achievable by using a linear
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2network coding scheme [2], [3]. In this paper, we focus on secure multicast connections in the
presence of a wiretapper that can access data on a limited number of edges of its choice. Our
primary goal is to design a network coding scheme that delivers data at maximum rate to all the
destinations and does not reveal any information about the transmitted message to the wiretapper.
The problem of making a linear network code information-theoretically secure in the presence
of a wiretaper that can look at a bounded number, say µ, of network edges was first studied by
Cai and Yeung in [4]. They considered directed graphs and constructed codes over an alphabet
with at least
(
|E|
µ
)
elements which can support a secure multicast rate of up to n−µ. In [5], they
proved that these codes use the minimum amount of randomness required to achieve the security
constraint. However, the algorithm due to [4] has high computational complexity and requires
a very large field size (exponential in the number of wiretapped edges). Feldman et al. derived
trade-offs between security, code alphabet size, and multicast rate of secure linear network coding
schemes in [6], by using ideas from secret sharing and abstracting the network topology. Another
approach was taken by Jain in [7] who obtained security by merely exploiting the topology of
the underlying network. Weakly secure network codes that insure that no meaningful information
is revealed to the adversary were studied by Bhattad and Narayanan in [8].
A related line of work considers a more powerful Byzantine adversary that can also modify the
packets on the edges it controls. Such an adversary can be potentially more harmful in networks
that employ the network coding technique because a modification in one packet can propagate
throughout the network and affect other packets as well. Secure network coding in the presence
of a Byzantine adversary has been studied by Ho et al. in [9] and Jaggi et al. in [10], [11], [12].
In [11], [12], the authors devise distributed polynomial-time algorithms that are rate-optimal and
achieve information theoretical security against several scenarios of adversarial attacks.
The problem of error correction in networks was also studied by Cai and Yeung in [13],
[14] where they generalized classical error-correction coding techniques to network settings. A
different model for error correction was introduced by Koetter and Kschischang in [15] where
communication is established by transmitting subspaces instead of vectors through the network.
The use of rank-metric codes for error control under this model was investigated in [16]. The
common approach in these works is to encode packets at the source, prior to sending them over
the network, using an error correcting code so that the packets carry not only data but also
some redundant information derived from the data which will help to reduce the probability of
3incorrect decoding.
We also consider the coding at the source technique to be a natural approach for addressing
the information-theoretic security of wiretap networks. In a network where the min-cut value
between the source and each receiver node is n and an adversary can access up to µ edges of
his choice, we introduce a coding at source scheme that ensures information-theoretic security
based on the Ozarow-Wyner wiretap channel of type II, introduced in [17] and [18], where the
source transmits n symbols to the receiver and an adversary can access any µ of those symbols.
Ozarow and Wyner showed that the maximum number of symbols (say k) that the source
can communicate to the receiver securely in the information-theoretic sense is equal to n − µ.
They also showed how to encode the k source symbols into the n channel symbols for secure
transmission. Clearly, if the n channel symbols are multicast over a network using a routing
scheme, the k source symbols remain secure in the presence of an adversary with access to
any µ edges. We will illustrate later that this is not necessarily the case when network coding
is used. However, we will show that a network code based on the Ozarow-Wyner scheme that
preserves security of the k source symbols, which are coded into the n multicast symbols, can
be designed over a sufficiently large field.
Using the observations made by Feldman et al. in [6], we show that our scheme is equivalent
to the one proposed in the pioneering work of Cai and Yeung in [4]. However, with our approach,
we can quickly and transparently recover some of the results available in the literature on
secure network coding for wiretapped networks. The algorithm due to [4] is based on the code
construction proposed by Li et al. in [3], however more efficient network coding algorithms have
been proposed recently (see, e.g., [19] and [20]). We use the results on the encoding complexity
of the network coding presented in [20], [21], [22] to derive new bounds on the required field
size of a secure network code that are independent of the number of edges in the network and
that depend only on the number k of source symbols and the number t of destinations. We
also propose an algorithm for construction of a secure network code that achieves these bounds.
Furthermore, we look at the dual problem and analyze the security of a given Ozarow-Wyner
code by studying the amount of information that can be gained by the wiretapper as a function
of the number of wiretapped edges.
Parts of the results presented in this paper were published in [1] and were later extended
in [23], [24] by Silva and Kschischang to construct universal secure network codes based on
4maximum rank-distance (MRD) codes, and by Mills et al. in [25] to achieve secrecy for wireless
erasure networks.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we briefly review the Ozarow-Wyner wiretap
channel of type II problem. In Section III, we introduce the network generalization of this
problem. In Section IV, we present an algorithm for secure network code design and establish
new bounds on the required code alphabet size. In Section V, we study the security of Ozarow-
Wyner codes. In Section VI, we highlight some connections of this work with other works on
secure network coding and network error correction. Finally, we conclude in Section VII with
a summary of our results and open problems.
II. WIRETAP CHANNEL II
We first consider a point-to-point scenario in which the source can transmit n symbols to the
receiver and an adversary can access any µ of those symbols [17], [18]. For this case, we know
that the maximum number of symbols that the source can communicate to the receiver securely
in the information-theoretic sense is equal to n− µ.
The problem is mathematically formulated as follows. Let S = (s1, s2, . . . , sk)T be the random
variable associated with the k information symbols that the source wishes to send securely,
Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)
T the random variable associated with the symbols that are transmitted
through the noiseless channel between the source and the receiver, and Z = (z1, z2, . . . , zµ)T the
random variable associated with the wiretapped symbolsof Y . When k ≤ n− µ, there exists an
encoding scheme that maps S into Y such that:
1) The uncertainty about S is not reduced by the knowledge of Z (perfect secrecy condition),
i.e.,
H(S|Z) = H(S), (1)
and,
2) The information S is completely determined (decodable) by the complete knowledge of
Y , that is,
H(S|Y ) = 0. (2)
For n = 2, k = 1, µ = 1, such a coding scheme can be constructed as follows. If the source
bit equals 0, then either 00 or 11 is transmitted through the channel with equal probability.
5Similarly, if the source bit equals 1, then either 01 or 10 is transmitted through the channel with
equal probability:
source bit s1 0 1
codeword y1y2 chosen
at random from {00, 11} {01, 10}
It is easy to see that knowledge of either y1 or y2 does not reduce the uncertainty about s1,
whereas the knowledge of both y1 and y2 is sufficient to completely determine s1, namely,
s1 = y1 + y2.
In general, k = n− µ symbols can be transmitted securely by a coding scheme based on an
[n, n − k] linear maximal distance separable (MDS) code C ⊂ Fnq . In this scheme, the encoder
is a probabilistic device which operates on the space Fnq partitioned into qk cosets of C, where
q is a large enough prime power. The k information symbols are taken as the syndrome which
specifies a coset, and the transmitted word is chosen uniformly at random from the specified
coset. The decoder recovers the information symbols by simply computing the syndrome of the
received word. Because of the properties of MDS codes, knowledge of any µ = n− k or fewer
symbols will leave the uncertainty of the k information symbols unchanged. The code used in
the above example is the [2, 1] repetition code with the parity check matrix
H =
[
1 1
]
. (3)
III. WIRETAP NETWORK II
We now consider an acyclic multicast network G = (V,E) with unit capacity edges, an
information source, t receivers, and the value of the min-cut to each receiver is equal to n. The
goal is to maximize the multicast rate with the constraint of revealing no information about the
multicast data to the adversary that can access data on any µ edges. We assume that the adversary
knows the implemented network code, i.e. all the coefficients of the linear combinations that
determine the packets on each edge. Moreover, we assume that there is no shared randomness
between the source and the receivers. The latter assumption rules out the use of traditional “key”
cryptography to achieve security.
It can be seen that the wiretap channel of type II is equivalent to the simple unicast network
of Figure 1 formed by n disjoint edges between the source and the destination, each carrying a
different symbol. For this network, the source can multicast k ≤ n − µ symbols securely if it
6y1, . . . , yn
S
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Fig. 1. Network equivalent to the wiretap channel of type II.
first applies a secure wiretap channel code (as described above) mapping k information symbols
into n transmitted symbols (y1, . . . , yn).
For general networks, when security is not an issue, we know that a multicast rate n is possible
with linear network coding [2], [3]. It is interesting to ask whether, using the same network code,
the source can always multicast k ≤ n − µ symbols securely using a wiretap channel code at
the source. Naturally, this would be a solution if a multicast rate of n can be achieved just by
routing.
Example 1 (Butterfly Network): Consider this approach for the butterfly network shown in
Figure 2 where we have n = 2, k = 1, µ = 1. If the source applies the coding scheme described
in the previous section and the usual network code as in Figure 2(a), the wiretapper will be
able to learn the source symbol if it taps into any of the edges BE, EF or ED. Therefore, a
network code can break down a secure wiretap channel code. However, if the network code is
changed so that node B combines its inputs over, e.g., F3 and the coding vector of edge BE is[
1 α
]
where α is a primitive element of F3 (i.e., the message sent on edge BE is x1 + αx2 as
in Figure 2(b)), the wiretap channel code remains secure, that is, the adversary cannot gain any
information by accessing any single edge in the network. Note that the wiretap channel code
based on the MDS code with H =
[
1 1
]
remains secure with any network code whose BE
coding vector is linearly independent of
[
1 1
]
.
We will next show that the source can multicast k ≤ n−µ symbols securely if it first applies
a secure wiretap channel code based on an MDS code with a k × n parity check matrix H
7S
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x1 + αx2 x1 + αx2
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Single-edge wiretap butterfly network with a) insecure network code and b) secure network code.
if the network code is such that no linear combination of µ = n − k or fewer coding vectors
belongs to the space spanned by the rows of H. Let W ⊂ E denote the set of |W | = µ edges
the wiretapper chooses to observe, and ZW = (z1, z2, . . . , zµ)T the random variable associated
with the packets carried by the edges in W . Let CW denote the matrix whose rows are the
coding vectors associated with the observed edges in W . As in the case of the wiretap channel,
S = (s1, s2, . . . , sk)
T denotes the random variable associated with the k information symbols
that the source wishes to send securely, and Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)T the random variable associated
with the n wiretap channel code symbols. The n symbols of Y will be multicast through the
network by using linear network coding. Writing H(S, Y, ZW ) in two different forms, and taking
8into account the decodability condition of Equation (2), we get
H(S|ZW ) +H(Y |SZW ) = H(Y |ZW ) +H(S|Y ZW )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
. (4)
Our objective is to conceal all the information data from the wiretapper. The perfect secrecy
condition implies
H(S|ZW ) = H(S), ∀W ⊂ E s.t. |W | = µ.
Thus we obtain,
H(Y |SZW ) = H(Y |ZW )−H(S). (5)
This implies, in turn that
n− rank(CW )− k ≥ 0. (6)
Since there is a choice of edges such that rank(CW ) = µ, the maximum rate for secure
transmission is bounded as
k ≤ n− µ.
If the bound is achieved with equality, we have H(Y |SZW ) = 0 and consequently, the system
of equations 
 S
Zw

 =

 H
CW

 · Y
has to have a unique solution for all W for which rank(CW ) = µ. That is,
rank

 H
CW

 = n for all CW s.t. rank(CW ) = µ. (7)
This analysis proves the following result:
Theorem 1: Let G = (V,E) be an acyclic multicast network with unit capacity edges and an
information source such that the size of a minimum cut between the source and each receiver
is equal to n. Then, a wiretap code at the source based on an MDS code with a k × n parity
check matrix H and a network code such that no linear combination of µ = n − k or fewer
coding vectors belongs to the space spanned by the rows of H make the network information-
theoretically secure against a wiretap adversary who can observe at most µ ≤ n− k edges. Any
9adversary able to observe more than n− k edges will have uncertainty about the source smaller
than k.
Next, we give an application of the previous theorem to the family of combination networks
illustrated in Figure 3.
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · · · · ·
n
M
n
R1 R(Mn )
Fig. 3. Combination B(n,M) network.
Example 2 (Combination Networks): A combination network B(n,M) is defined over a 3-
partite graph comprising three layers. The first layer contains a single source node, the second
layer M intermediate nodes and the last layer is formed by
(
M
n
)
receiver nodes such that every
set of n nodes of the second layer is observed by a receiver.
The result of Theorem 1 can be used to construct a secure network code for B(n,M) from
an [M + k,M + k − n] MDS code which would achieve perfect secrecy against a wiretapper
that can observe any µ = n− k edges in the network. Let H be an n× (M + k) parity check
matrix of such MDS code over Fq. A secure network code can be obtained by taking the first
k rows of HT to form the matrix of the coset code at the source, and the rest of the rows of
HT to be the coding vectors of the M edges going out of the source. Equation (7) is satisfied
since the considered code is MDS and, therefore, any n columns of H form a basis of Fnq . For
instance if M + k+1 is equal to a prime power q, a secure network code can be derived based
on an [M + k,M + k − n] Reed-Solomon code with the following Vandermonde parity check
matrix
H =


1 α . . . αM+k−1
1 α2 . . . α2(M+k−1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αn . . . αn(M+k−1)

 , (8)
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where α is a primitive element of Fq. Figure 4 depicts a secure network code for the network
B(3, 4) and k = 2 using a [6,3] Reed-Solomon code over F7 whose parity check matrix is given
by Equation (8) for α = 3.
(s1, s2)
H =

1 1 1
3 2 6

Coset Code
(y1, y2, y3)
2y1 + 4y2 + y3
6y1 + y2 + 6y3 4y1 + 2y2 + y3
5y1 + 4y2 + 6y3
R1 R4R2 R3
Fig. 4. A secure network code for the B(3, 4) combination network based on a [6,3] Reed-Solomon code over F7.
The above analysis shows that the maximum throughput can be achieved by applying a
wiretap channel code at the source and then designing the network code while respecting certain
constraints. The decoding of secure source symbols S is then merely a matrix multiplication of
the decoded multicast symbols Y since HY = S. The method gives us a better insight of how
much information the adversary gets if he can access more edges than the code is designed for.
It also enables us to design secure network coding schemes over smaller alphabets. These two
issues are discussed in detail in the next two sections.
IV. NETWORK CODE DESIGN ALPHABET SIZE
The approach described previously in the literature for finding a secure multicast network
code consisted of decoupling the problem of designing a multicast network code and making it
secure by using some code on top of it. Feldman et al. showed in [6] that there exist networks
where the above construction might require a quite large field size. In this section, we present a
different construction that exploits the topology of the network. This is accomplished by adding
the security constraints to the Linear Information Flow (LIF) algorithm of [19] that constructs
11
linear multicast network codes in polynomial time in the number of edges in the graph. The
result is a better lower bound on the sufficient field size. However, the modified LIF algorithm
does not have a polynomial time complexity.
We start by giving a brief high level overview of the LIF algorithm of [19]. The inputs of the
algorithm are the network, the source node, the t receivers and the number n of packets that
need to be multicast to all receivers. Assuming the min-cut between the source and any receiver
is at least n, the algorithm outputs a linear network code that guaranties the delivery of the n
packets to all the receivers.
The algorithm starts by 1) finding t flows F1, F2, . . . , Ft of value n each, from the source to to
each receiver and 2) defining t n×n matrices BFj (one for each receiver) formed by the global
encoding vectors of the n last visited edges in the flow Fj . Initially, each matrix BFj is equal to
the identity matrix In. Then, the algorithm goes over the network edges, visiting each one in a
topological order. In each iteration, the algorithm finds a suitable local encoding vector for the
visited edge, and updates all of the t matrices BFj . The algorithm maintains the invariant that
the matrices BFj remain invertible after each iteration. Thus, when it terminates, each receiver
will get n linear combinations of the original packets that form a full rank system. Thus each
destination can solve for these packets by inverting the corresponding matrix.
The analysis of the algorithm due to [19] implies that a field of size at least t (the number of
destinations) is sufficient for finding the desired network code. In particular, as shown in [19,
Lemma 8], a field of size larger or equal to t is sufficient for satisfying the condition that the t
matrices BFj are always invertible.
To construct a secure network code, we modify the LIF algorithm in the following way. We
select a k × n parity check matrix H. Without loss of generality, we assume that the µ packets
observed by the wiretapper are linearly independent, i.e., rank CW = µ. We denote by ei the
edge visited at the i-th iteration of the LIF algorithm, and by Pi the set of the edges that have
been processed by the end of it. Then, we extend the set of invariants to guaranty that the
encoding vectors are chosen so that the matrices MW =
[
H
CW
]
are also invertible; which, by
Theorem 1, achieves the security condition. More precisely, using the same techniques as the
original LIF algorithm, we make sure that by the end of the i-th iteration, the matrices BFj and
the matrices MWi are invertible; where Wi = {ei} ∪W ′ and W ′ is a subset of Pi containing
µ − 1 = n − k − 1 edges. The total number of matrices that need to be kept invertible in this
12
modified version of the LIF algorithm is at most
(
|E|−1
µ−1
)
+ t. Thus, similarly as in [19, Lemma
8], we obtain the following improved bound on the alphabet size for secure multicast:
Theorem 2: Let G = (V,E) be an acyclic network with unit capacity edges and an information
source such that the min-cut value to each of the t receivers is equal to n. A secure multicast at
rate k ≤ n−µ in the presence of a wiretapper who can observe at most µ ≤ n edges is possible
over the alphabet Fq of size
q ≥
(
|E| − 1
µ− 1
)
+ t. (9)
The bound given by Equation (9) can be further improved by realizing as was first done in
[20] that not all edges in the network carry different linear combination of the source symbols.
Langberg et al. showed in [21] that the number of encoding edges in a minimal acyclic multicast
network is bounded by 2n3t2. Encoding edges create new packets by combining the packets
received over the incoming edges of their tail nodes. A minimal multicast network does not
contain redundant edges, i.e., edges that can be removed from the network without violating its
optimality. Reference [22] presents an efficient algorithm for construction of a minimal acyclic
network Ĝ from the original network G. This work also shows that a feasible network code for
a minimal network can be used for the original network as well with only slight modifications.
The main idea of our scheme is to find a secure network code for the minimal network Ĝ,
and then use the procedure described in [22] to construct a network code for original network
G which will also be secure. Now consider the problem of finding secure network codes for Ĝ.
This problem will not change if the wiretapper is not allowed to wiretap the forwarding edges,
i.e., the edges that just forward packets received by their tail nodes. Therefore, the set of edges
that the wiretapper might have access to consists of the encoding edges and the edges outgoing
from the source. The number of such edges is bounded by 2n3t2. Now, applying Theorem 2 on
Ĝ and taking into consideration the restriction on the edges that can be potentially wiretapped,
we obtain the following bound on the sufficient field size which is independent of the size of
the network.
Corollary 1: For the transmission scenario of Theorem 2, a secure mulitcast network code
always exists over the alphabet Fq of size
q ≥
(
2k3t2
µ− 1
)
+ t. (10)
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For networks with two sources, we can completely settle the question on the required alphabet
size for a secure network code. Note that the adversary has to be limited to observing at most
one edge of his choice. Based on the work of Fragouli and Soljanin in [20], the coding problem
for these networks is equivalent to a vertex coloring problem of some specially designed graphs,
where the colors correspond to the points on the projective line PG(1, q):
[0 1], [1 0], and [1αi] for 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 2, (11)
where α is a primitive element of Fq. Clearly, any network with two sources and arbitrary number
of receives can be securely coded by reducing the set of available colors in (11) by removing
point (color) [1 1] and applying a wiretap code based on the matrix H = [1 1] as in the example
above. Alphabet size sufficient to securely code all network with two sources also follows from
[20]:
Theorem 3: For any configuration with two sources t receivers, the code alphabet Fq of size
⌊
√
2t− 7/4 + 1/2⌋+ 1
is sufficient for a secure network code. There exist configurations for which it is necessary.
V. WIRETAPPER EQUIVOCATION
In this section, we analyze the performance of coset codes in the case of a wiretapper with
variable strength, i.e., the number µ of edges he can observe is not fixed. For a given coset code,
we seek to quantify the amount of information that is leaked to the wiretapper as a function of
µ.
Assume that at the source s of a multicast network a coset code defined by a k × n parity
check matrix H is used as described in the previous section. The equivocation ∆(µ) of the
wiretapper, i.e., the uncertainty it has about the information source vector S = (s1, . . . , sk)T , is
defined, as in [18], based on the worst case scenario, by
∆(µ) := min
W⊂E;|W |=µ
H(S|ZW ), (12)
where ZW = (z1, . . . , zµ)T is the random variable representing the observed packets on the
set W ⊆ E of wiretapped edges. We have ZW = CWY where CW is an µ × n matrix, and
Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
T is the output of the coset code at the source. It can be seen that ∆(µ) can
be written as:
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∆(µ) = min
W⊂E;|W |=µ
rank(CW )=µ
H(S|ZW ). (13)
Therefore, we will assume from now on without loss of generality that W is such that
rank(CW ) = µ. For a given choice of such W , let C⊥W be the parity check matrix of the [n, µ]
code generated by CW . Let In be the n× n identity matrix. Define Jn,µ to be the n× (n− µ)
matrix where the first µ rows are all zeros and the last n−µ rows form In−µ. Theorem 4 below
gives the expression of ∆(µ) which depends on the network code and the coset code used.
Theorem 4:
∆(µ) = min
W⊂E;|W |=µ
rank(CW )=µ
rank(H

CW
C⊥W


−1
Jn,µ). (14)
Proof:
First let AW =

CW
C⊥W

 . By Equation (4), we have
H(S|ZW ) = H(Y |ZW )−H(Y |SZW )
= n− rank(CW )− (n− rank

 H
CW

)
= rank(

 H
CW

A−1W )− rank(CW )
= rank(

 HA−1W
CWA
−1
W

)− rank(CW )
= dim(〈HA−1W 〉) + dim(〈CWA
−1
W 〉)
− dim(〈HA−1W 〉 ∩ 〈CWA
−1
W 〉)− rank(CW )
= k − dim(〈HA−1W 〉 ∩ 〈J
′
n,µ〉),
(15)
where 〈·〉 denotes the row space of a matrix and J ′n,µ is the µ × n matrix where the first µ
columns form Iµ and the last n− µ columns are all zeros. Note that dim(〈HA−1W 〉 ∩ 〈J ′n,µ〉) is
exactly k minus the rank of the last n− µ column vectors of HA−1W .
A relevant concept to our work here is that of the generalized Hamming weights d1(C), . . . , dk(C)
of a linear code C which was introduced by Wei in [26] and that characterize the performance
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of coset codes over the classical wiretap channel of type II. The generalized Hamming weights
were extended to the wiretap networks setting in [27]. Given a certain network with an asso-
ciated network and coset codes, Theorem 4 provides an equivalent expression of the network
formulation of the r-th generalized Hamming weight dr as the minimum number of edges that
should be wiretapped to leak r symbols to the wiretapper. Then, we can write
dr := min{µ; ∆(µ) = k − r}
:= min{µ; min
W⊂E;|W |=µ
rank(CW )=µ
rank(H

CW
C⊥W


−1
Jn,µ) = k − r}.
(16)
Next, we focus on three special cases. First, we revisit the model of the wiretap channel of
type II of [17]. Second, we consider the case where the wiretapper may gain access to more
edges than what the secure code is designed to combat. Third, we study the scenario where only
a part of the network edges are vulnerable to wiretapping.
A. Wiretap Channel of Type II
Consider again the wiretap channel of type II studied in [17]. Theorem 4 can be used to easily
recover the following classical result for this channel.
Corollary 2: The equivocation rate of the wiretapper in the wiretap channel of type II is given
by
∆(µ) = min
U⊆{1,2,...,n}
|U |=n−µ
rank{Hi; i ∈ U}, (17)
where Hi denote the ith column of the parity check matrix H.
Proof: The wiretap channel of type II is equivalent to the network depicted in Figure 1.
Assume that the edges between the source and the destination are indexed from 1 to n, so that
E = {1, . . . , n}. For any W ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, define IW to be the matrix formed by the rows of
the n × n identity matrix indexed by the elements of W in an increasing order. Since edge i
carries the packet yi, for a given set W ⊆ E of wiretapped edges, CW = IW and C⊥W = IU ,
where U = {1, . . . , n} \W . Therefore, A−1W =

IW
IU


−1
= ATW , and the last n − µ columns of
HATW are exactly the columns of H indexed by U .
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B. Underestimated Wiretapper
Suppose the coset code defined by the k × n parity check matrix H satisfies Theorem 1
and achieves perfect secrecy against a wiretapper that can observe λ edges. If, however, the
wiretapper can access µ edges, where µ > λ, then the amount of information leaked to the
wiretapper can be shown to be equal to µ− λ, i.e., the number of additional wiretapped edges.
Corollary 3: For the case of an underestimated wiretapper, the equivocation of the wiretapper
is given by:
∆(µ) = k − (µ− λ).
Proof: Since the coset code achieves perfect secrecy for λ wiretapped edges, by Theorem 1,
we have k = n− λ and H(S|Y ZW ) = 0. Thus, Equation (4) gives
H(S|ZW ) = H(Y |ZW ) = n− rank(CW ) = k + λ− rank(CW ).
The minimum value of H(S|ZW ) is obtained when CW has maximal rank, i.e, when rank(CW ) = µ.
C. Restricted Wiretapper
In practice, for instance in large networks, the wiretapper may not have access to all the
network edges, and his choice of µ edges is limited to a certain edge subset E ′ ⊂ E. For this
model, the equivocation rate of the wiretapper is determined by Equation 14 where E is replaced
by E ′. An interesting case arises, however, when the edges in E ′ belong to a cut of n edges
between the source and one of the receivers. In this case, the performance of the coset code is
the same as when it is used for a wiretap channel of type II.
Corollary 4: In the case of a restricted wiretapper that can observe any µ edges in a cut
between the source and one of the destinations, the equivocation rate of the wiretapper is given
by Equation (17).
Proof: Assume the edges that are vulnerable to wiretapping are indexed from 1 to n,
so that E ′ = {1, . . . , n}. Let ZE′ = (z1, . . . , zn)T denote the packets carried by those edges,
such that edge i carries packet zi. We can write ZE′ = CE′Y , where CE′ is an n × n matrix.
Since the cut comprises n edges, the matrix CE′ is invertible; otherwise, by the properties of
linear network codes, the destination corresponding to the considered cut cannot decode Y . For
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Fig. 5. A coding scheme achieving perfect secrecy against a limited Byzantine wiretapper.
a choice W ⊆ E ′ of wiretapped edges, we have ZW = CWY , where CW = IWCE′. Moreover,
C⊥W = IWCE′ , where W = E ′ \W . Therefore,
H

CW
C⊥W


−1
= H(CE′

IW
IW

)−1 = HC−1E′

IW
IW


T
.
Similar to the proof of Corollary 2, the last n − µ columns of HA−1

IW
IW


T
are exactly the
columns of HA−1 indexed by U . So, by Theorem 4, we have
∆(µ) = min
U⊆{1,2,...,n}
|U |=n−µ
rank{(HA−1)i; i ∈ U}
= min
U⊆{1,2,...,n}
|U |=n−µ
rank{Hi; i ∈ U}.
Note that the previous result still holds for any subset E ′ of possible wiretapped edges such that
CE′ is invertible. For this scenario, the equivocation rate of the wiretapper can be alternatively
given by the generalized Hamming weights [26] d1(C), . . . , dk(C) of the linear code C generated
by H. In this case, for a given µ, ∆(µ) is the unique solution to the following inequalities [26,
Cor. A]:
dn−µ−∆(µ)(C)) ≤ n− µ < dn−µ−∆(µ)+1(C).
VI. CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER SCHEMES
In this section, we explore the relationship between the proposed scheme and previously known
constructions [4], [28], [29], [23].
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A. Secure Network Coding and Filtered Secret Sharing
Cai and Yeung were first to study the design of secure network codes for multicast demands
[4]. They showed that, in the setting described above, a secure network code can be found for
any k ≤ n− µ. Their construction is equivalent to the following scheme:
1) Generate a vector R = (r1, r2, . . . , rµ)T choosing its components uniformly at random
over Fq,
2) Form vector X by concatenating the µ random symbols R to the k source symbols S:
X =
[
S
R
]
= (s1, . . . , sk, r1, . . . , rµ)
T
3) Chose an invertible n× n matrix T over Fq and a feasible multicast network code [3] to
ensure the security condition (1). (It is shown in [4, Thm. 1] that such code and matrix T
can be found provided that q >
(
|E|
µ
)
.)
4) Compute Y = TX and multicast Y to all the destinations by using the constructed code.
Feldman et al. considered also the same problem in [6]. Adopting the same approach of
[4], they showed that in order for the code to be secure, the matrix T should satisfy certain
conditions ([6, Thm. 6]). In particular, they showed that in the above transmission scheme, the
security condition (1) holds if and only if any set of vectors consisting of
1) at most µ linearly independent edge coding vectors and/or
2) any number of vectors from the first k rows of T−1
is linearly independent. They also showed that if one sacrifices in the number of information
packets, that is, take k < n − µ, then it is possible to find secure network codes over fields of
size much smaller than the very large bound q >
(
|E|
µ
)
.
We will now show that our approach based on coding for the wiretap channel at the source
is equivalent to the above stated scheme [4] with the conditions of [6].
Proposition 1: For any n× n matrix T satisfying the security conditions defined above, the
k×n matrix H = T ∗ formed by taking the first k rows of T−1 satisfy the condition of Theorem 1.
Proof: Consider the secure multicast scheme of [4] as presented above. For a given
information vector S ∈ Fkq , let B(S) be the set of all possible vectors Y ∈ Fnq that could
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be multicast through the network under this scheme. More precisely,
B(S) =
{
Y ∈ Fnq |Y = TX,X =
[
S
R
]
, R ∈ Fn−kq
}
.
Then, for all Y ∈ B(S), we have T ∗Y = T ∗T
[
S
T
]
= S. Therefore, any Y ∈ B(S) also belongs
to the coset of the space spanned by the rows of T ∗ whose syndrome is equal to S. Moreover,
since T is invertible, |B(S)| = 2n−k implying that set B(S) is exactly that coset. The conditions
of [6] as stated above directly translate into (18), the remaining condition of Theorem 1.
B. Universal Secure Network Codes
For practical implementations of linear multicast network codes over Fq, the information
sources are typically packets of a certain length m, i.e., s1, . . . , sk are vectors in Fmq . Applying
the approach presented in the preliminary version of this paper [1], Silva and Kschischang
devised in [23] a scheme that achieves a complete decoupling between the secure code and the
network code design. Their scheme is universal in the sense that it achieves secrecy by applying
a coset code at source with no knowledge of the network code used. The main idea is to use
a special class of MDS codes called maximal rank-distance codes (MRD) which are non-linear
over Fq but linear over the extension field Fqm . The parity check matrix of an MRD code over
Fqm , has the interesting property that it always satisfies the condition of Theorem 1 when the
edge coding vectors are over Fq, as stated in the theorem below.
Lemma 1: [23, Lemma 3] Let H be the parity check matrix of an [n, n−k] linear MRD code
over Fqm . For any full rank (n− k)× n matrix B over Fq, the n× n matrix

H
B

 is invertible.
Therefore, MRD codes will always achieve perfect secrecy irrespective of the network code
used. The choice of the MRD code will only depend on the underlying field Fq of the network
code.
C. Byzantine Adversaries
The malicious activity of the wiretapper in the model considered in this paper was restricted to
eavesdropping. A more powerful wiretapper, with jamming capabilities, may not only listen to the
data in the network but also alter it. This may lead to flooding the whole network with erroneous
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packets. Schemes to combat such wiretappers, known in literature as Byzantine adversaries, were
studied in [12], [15], [16] and the references within.
Consider a scenario where the wiretapper can not only observe µ edges but also jam α edges
of his choice that are unknown to the destinations. In this case, we will describe a coding
scheme that achieves a multicast rate of k = n−2α−µ and guaranties that the information will
remain hidden from the wiretapper. This can be achieved by using a coset code as described in
Section III followed by a powerful network error-correcting code [13], [14]. First, we recall an
important result in [14, Theorem 4]
Theorem 5: For an acyclic network G(V,E) with min-cut n, there exists a linear α-error-
correcting code of dimension (n− 2α) over a sufficiently large field.
Let G be the generator matrix of a linear α-error-correcting code of dimension (n−2α) whose
existence is guaranteed by the previous theorem, and Let G⊥ be its parity check matrix. A block
diagram of the coding scheme that achieves secrecy against a Byzantine wiretapper at a rate
k = n − 2α − µ is depicted in Figure 5. First, the information S = (s1, . . . , sk)T is encoded
using a coset code of parity check matrix H into the vector T = (t1, . . . , tm)T , with m = k+µ.
The vector T is then encoded into Y = (y1, . . . , yn)T = GT using the network error-correcting
code. To achieve perfect secrecy, H should satisfy the condition of Theorem 1, which can be
expressed here as:
rank

 H
CWG

 = k + µ for all CW s.t. rank(CW ) = µ. (18)
We assume that the code is over a field large enough to guaranty the existence of the network
error-correcting code and the matrix H satisfying the above condition as well. At each destination,
a decoder corrects the errors introduced by the wiretapper and recovers T . The information S is
then obtained as the unique solution of the system HS = T . It was recently shown in [30] that
the rate k = n− 2α− µ is optimal and another construction for codes with the same properties
was presented there.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered the problem of securing a multicast network implementing network coding
against a wiretapper capable of observing a limited number of edges of his choice, as defined
initially by Cai and Yeung. We showed that the problem can be formulated as a generalization
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of the wiretap channel of type II which was introduced and studied by Ozarow and Wyner, and
decomposed into two sub-problems: the first one consists of designing a secure wiretap channel
code, or a coset code, and the second consists of designing a network code satisfying some
additional constraints. We proved there is no penalty to pay by adopting this separation, which
we find in many ways illuminative. Moreover, this approach allowed us to derive new bounds on
the required alphabet size for secure codes. These new bounds differ from those in the literature
in that they are independent from the network size and are functions of only the number of
information symbols and that of destinations. We also analyzed the performance of the proposed
coset codes under various wiretapper scenarios.
A number of interesting questions related to this problem remain open. For instance, the
bounds presented here on the code alphabet size can be large in certain cases and it is worthy to
investigate whether tighter bounds exist. Another issue which was not addressed in this paper is
that of designing efficient decoding algorithms at the destinations which can be very important
in practical implementations. Also, the work of [23] hinted at some advantages of non-linear
codes. The benefits of nonlinearity in security applications, whether at the source code or at the
network code level, are still to be better understood.
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